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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

water channel, raising the level of water covering the stumps, and
failing to place buoys where the stumps remained. The court
reasoned that human effort creates an "artificial" condition.
"Latent," as defined by Washington case law, means "not readily
apparent to the recreational user." An additional inquiry is whether
the injury-causing condition is "readily apparent to the general class of
recreational users, not whether one user might fail to discover it." The
court held the record inconclusive about the latency of the tree
stumps; thus, the issue was a matter of fact precluding summary
judgment.
The dissent disagreed with the court's interpretation of "artificial."
The dissent stated that the purpose of the statute combined with the
statutory language and previous case law dictate that "artificial" should
be construed narrowly; thus, the majority's definition was overbroad
and contrary to the purpose of the statute. The dissent also attacked
the majority's latency analysis.
Against the second defendant, the County of Spokane, the plaintiff
challenged the public duty doctrine's barring of his claim that he was a
third party beneficiary of a funding agreement between the County
and the State Parks and Recreation Commission. In Washington, the
public duty doctrine bars negligence claims by individuals against a
governmental entity absent clear statutory legislative intent to identify
and protect a "particular and circumscribed class of persons"- the
"legislative intent exception." The intent to protect a specific group
must be clearly expressed; it will not be implied. The exception allows
a plaintiff to bring a claim against the governmental entity for statute
violation if the plaintiff can show his or her membership in the clearly
identified class.
Here, the plaintiff argued that an agreement between State Parks
and the County made pursuant to the state boating safety grants and
contracts program defined the duty of the County toward recreational
boaters thereby creating a specific class apart from the public at large.
The court held that the County, in the agreement, did not assume
responsibilities beyond those existing in statutory and tort law;
therefore, the public duty doctrine barred the plaintiffs claim.
Amy Beatie

Wedden H v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that an ordinance banning personal watercraft is not in conflict with
other state law, and does not violate county's police powers or
substantive due process).
After reviewing the negative effects of motorized personal
watercraft (essentially 'jet skis" or "PWCs") on marine life and tourism,
San Juan County passed an ordinance banning the use of them "on all
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waters of San Juan County" and "on Sportsman Lake" in the county.
This case presented an appeal from the decision by the trial court that
held the ordinance void. The standard under which the Washington
Supreme Court reviewed the case was de novo. The court made its
decision in response to three issues: whether the ordinance was in
conflict with other state law; "[wa]s an unreasonable exercise of [the
county's] police power," therefore violating the Washington State
Constitution; and whether it violated substantive due process.
In analyzing whether the ordinance violated the Washington
Constitution, the court first considered whether the ordinance
conflicted with other state law. The respondents claimed the
ordinance conflicted with the state boat permitting law and public
trust doctrine, specifically the Shoreline Management Act ("SMA")
and the Marine Recreation Land Act. The court held that the permit
law merely stated a "precondition to operating a boat" in Washington
by requiring a permit, and did not create "an unabridged right to
operate PWC in all waters throughout the state." Next, the court
found the ordinance consistent with the policy of the SMA since it
"favors 'the resources and ecology of the shoreline; over recreational
interests.'
Finally, respondents claimed a violation of the Marine Recreation
Land Act ("Act") because as a recipient of funds created by the Act
through fuel taxing on boats, San Juan County "must keep [their]
facilities open to 'all motorized vessels."' The court dismissed this
claim based on findings that while the language of the county's
agreement with the interagency committee for outdoor recreation
(established by the Act to distribute funds) provided that facilities will
"be kept open for public use," there was no language prohibiting the
county from "restrict[ing] the manner in which the public uses the
facilities."
A two-part test determined "the validity of a statute passed
pursuant to police power."
The court looked at whether the
ordinance "promote [d] the health, safety, peace, education, or welfare
of the people" and if it bore "some reasonable relationship to
accomplishing" the statute's underlying purpose.
Since the
ordinance's language conveyed an intent to protect the safety of other
boats, swimmers and wildlife of the area, the court concluded the first
part of the test met. Respondents took issue with the ban as an
inappropriate means to the ordinance's end. They claimed mere
public displeasure with PWC might not dictate the county's action, and
that the ordinance extended beyond local boundaries, affecting PWC
users and retailers outside of SanJuan County.
The court responded to these points by looking at the inadequacy
of existing noise regulations, the evidence of aquatic damage unique
to PWCs, and bans on PWCs in other jurisdictions "held reasonable."
In finding the ordinance "purely local," the court utilized a hunting
analogy: "[a] ban on hunting within a city is a valid exercise of the
police power." Since the ordinance only affects PWC activity within
San Juan County, and does not "preclude [county] residents from
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using PWC outside the County, nor does it regulate activities beyond
geographical limits," the court found the ordinance within county
police powers.
An "unduly oppressive" test determined violations of substantive
due process, and the court balanced the "public's interest against
those ... regulated." The court held that "[i]t defies logic to suggest
an ordinance is unduly oppressive when it only regulates the activity
which is directly responsible for the harm." Since PWCs directly
caused the harm to the public and environmental problems cited in
the evidence presented at trial, and their owners" are not being forced
to bear a financial burden or solve a societal problem not created by
PWC," the ordinance cannot be found unduly oppressive.
Jennifer Lee

DiBlasi v. City of Seattle, 969 P.2d 10 (Wash. 1998) (holding a
municipality liable for damages to adjacent landowner's property
caused by surface water that collected, channeled, and thrust onto the
property from a public street).
In 1924, a real estate developer dedicated certain roadways to the
City of Seattle ("City") for public use. The dedication also granted the
City the right to slope the original grading of the streets for cut or fills.
In 1975, Patricia DiBlasi, the plaintiff, built her house on the downhill
slope of 38" Street near the edge of a ravine. The developer allegedly
filled the ravine to extend 38" Street. Consequently, the City installed
a berm to stop surface water from running onto 38" Street. However,
in the spring of 1991, the City removed the berm when it resurfaced at
nearby Barton Street. Local residents and hydrology experts stated
that the removal doubled the amount of water flowing over 38"' Street.
This tore the street apart. After several complaints, the City reinstalled
the berm, but this failed to control water runoff during heavy rains.
The removal of the berm created a tension crack that extended 40 feet
east, across the south end of 38" Street and onto the plaintiffs
property. The City did not act to remedy the situation. In early April
1991, water pressure in the tension crack caused a landslide, which
destroyed a portion of the plaintiffs property. A landslide and
hydrology expert opined that the City could have prevented the severe
damage if it acted sooner and that the impermeable nature of the
street caused the collection of the surface waters.
The plaintiff asserted three theories for the City's liability. First,
Plaintiff claimed that the City failed to maintain its prescriptive
easement.
Second, Plaintiff asserted the street collected and
channeled surface waters in a manner different than the natural flow
of the water thrust onto the property of the plaintiff causing damage to
her property. Third, Plaintiff averred that she was entitled to inverse

